Graham Allison on the Risks of a US-China War
Timestamps are as accurate as they can be but may be slightly off. We encourage you to listen to the full context.
Podcast Summary
In this episode of Odd Lots, hosts Tracy Alloway and Joe Weisenthal interview Professor Graham Allison, the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at Harvard University, who coined the term "Thucydides Trap" to describe the heightened risk of war when an established power feels threatened by a rapidly rising power. (03:59) The conversation explores the structural dynamics driving US-China relations, examining how China's meteoric rise as a global power creates inevitable friction with the US as the established ruling power. Professor Allison explains that historically, in 16 similar cases over the past 500 years, 12 ended in war while only 4 avoided conflict - with the Cold War being a notable example of successful management.
- Core themes include the structural nature of great power competition, the role of economic interdependence in preventing conflict, and the critical importance of skilled statecraft in navigating dangerous geopolitical transitions.
Speakers
Professor Graham Allison
Graham Allison is the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at Harvard University and a leading expert on US-China relations and national security. He is the author of "Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides' Trap?" and coined the term "Thucydides Trap" to describe the dangerous dynamics between rising and ruling powers. (03:59) He has served as a mentor and advisor to numerous political leaders and maintains regular dialogue with Chinese policymakers, having been described as Thucydides' "best publicity agent" in China due to increased sales of the Peloponnesian War in Mandarin following his work.
Tracy Alloway
Tracy Alloway is co-host of the Bloomberg Odd Lots podcast and a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. She has extensive experience covering financial markets and economic policy, with a background in international relations.
Joe Weisenthal
Joe Weisenthal is co-host of the Bloomberg Odd Lots podcast and a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. He focuses on economics, financial markets, and monetary policy, also holding a background in international relations.
Key Takeaways
The Thucydides Trap Is Structural, Not Personal
Professor Allison emphasizes that the current US-China rivalry stems from structural forces rather than individual leaders' personalities or specific policies. (04:40) Using the metaphor of a seesaw on a playground, he explains how China's meteoric rise creates inevitable "discombobulation" for both powers - the US feels its relative position slipping while China grows more confident. This dynamic has played out 16 times in the past 500 years, with 12 cases ending in war. The key insight is that roughly 80% of the current tension is "baked into the structure" regardless of who leads either country, making it essential to focus on managing structural forces rather than hoping for different leadership.
Economic Interdependence Can Provide Stability
Despite skepticism about globalization preventing conflict, Professor Allison sees economic entanglement as a potential stabilizing force in US-China relations. (23:54) He notes that Trump, unlike many in the foreign policy establishment, believes both countries can maintain fierce rivalry while finding areas of beneficial cooperation. The professor draws parallels to the Cold War, where the US and Soviet Union were "the fiercest rivals at all times" yet required cooperation for mutual survival. China and the US are so economically intertwined through supply chains and trade that their survival increasingly depends on managing competition without destroying cooperation.
China's Non-Missionary Approach Differs from Historical Powers
Unlike the Soviet Union or even the United States, China has little interest in converting other nations to its system of governance. (19:49) Professor Allison quotes Henry Kissinger's observation that "Americans and Chinese are very similar in that both have a superiority complex, but only one of us is a missionary." China wants respect and recognition but doesn't seek to make other countries Chinese or impose its governance model globally. This fundamental difference from previous rising powers like the Soviet Union, which actively sought to spread communist ideology worldwide, suggests different dynamics in how conflicts might unfold or be avoided.
Third-Party Incidents Pose the Greatest War Risk
The most dangerous scenarios for US-China conflict involve third-party actors whose actions could trigger escalation between the superpowers. (43:00) Professor Allison identifies Taiwan's current president and potential naval collisions in the South China Sea as the leading candidates for such incidents. Just as the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo - so inconsequential it didn't make front pages in New York newspapers - led to World War I within five weeks, seemingly minor third-party events can escalate rapidly when great powers are already in a state of structural rivalry and mutual distrust.
Competent Statecraft Remains Critical
Despite structural forces driving conflict, skilled leadership and statecraft can make the difference between war and peace. Professor Allison emphasizes that the Cuban Missile Crisis, where JFK believed there was a one-in-three chance of nuclear war, was resolved through "brilliant statecraft" and communication channels. (14:14) He advocates for maintaining "candid and private" communication between US and Chinese leaders to serve as "circuit breakers" when accidents or incidents occur. The lesson is that while structural forces create dangerous conditions, individual leaders' choices and diplomatic skills can prevent these conditions from leading to catastrophic outcomes.
Statistics & Facts
- In 16 historical cases of rising powers challenging ruling powers over the past 500 years, 12 ended in war while only 4 avoided conflict. (13:01) Professor Allison uses this data to demonstrate that the Thucydides Trap is a documented historical pattern, not just theoretical speculation.
- The current period represents the longest stretch without great power war since Rome - approximately 80 years as of September. (05:49) This statistic provides crucial context that while current tensions are concerning, we're living in an historically unprecedented period of great power peace.
- China's nuclear arsenal is expanding from about 500 weapons to approximately 1,000 weapons by 2030. (40:51) Professor Allison notes this is often cited as evidence of aggressive Chinese intentions, but points out the US had faster nuclear buildups during the Eisenhower and Kennedy periods.
